We present a five-round algebraic property of the advanced encryption standard (AES), and we show that this algebraic property can be used to analyse the internal structure of ALPHA-MAC whose underlying block cipher is AES. In the proposed property, we modify 20 bytes from 5 intermediate values at some fixed locations in 5 consecutive rounds, and we show that after 5 rounds of operations, such modifications do not change the intermediate result and finally, still produce the same ciphertext. By employing the proposed five-round algebraic property of AES, we provide a method to find second preimages of the ALPHA-MAC based on the assumption that a key or an intermediate value is known. We also show that our idea can also be used to find internal collisions of the ALPHA-MAC under the same assumption.
Introduction
The block cipher Rijndael, invented by Daemen and Rijmen (2001) , was selected as the advanced encryption standard (AES) by National Institute of Standards and Technology. Rijndael has a simple and elegant structure, and it was designed carefully to withstand two well-known cryptanalytic attacks: differential cryptanalysis, proposed by Biham and Shamir (1993) and linear cryptanalysis, described by Matsui (1994) . Most operations of Rijndael are based on the algebraic Galois field GF (2 8 ), which can be implemented efficiently in dedicated hardware and in software on a wide range of processors.
Since Rijndael was adopted as a standard by National Institute of Standards and Technology (2001) , there have been many research efforts aiming to evaluate the security of this cipher. A block cipher, named big encryption system (BES), was defined by Murphy and Robshaw (2002) , and Rijndael can be embedded into BES. The extended linearisation (XL) proposed by Courtois et al. (2000) and the extended sparse linearisation (XSL) provided by Courtois and Pieprzyk (2002) are new methods to solve non-linear algebraic equations. The concept of dual ciphers was introduced by Barkan and Biham (2002) , and a collision attack on seven rounds of Rijndael was described by Gilbert and Minier (2000) . The most effective attacks on reduced round variants of the AES are square attack which was found by Daemen et al. (1997) . The idea of the square attack was later employed by Ferguson et al. (2001) to improve the cryptanalysis of Rijndael, and by Lucks (2000) to attack seven rounds of Rijndael under 192-and 256-bit keys. A multiplicative masking method of AES was proposed by Akkar and Giraud (2001) and further discussed by Golic and Tymen (2002) . The design of an AES-based stream cipher LEX was described by Biryukov (2007) . A new message authentication code (MAC) construction ALRED and a special instance ALPHA-MAC was designed by Daemen and Rijmen (2005) . So far, no short-cut attack against the full-round AES has been found.
In this paper, we present a five-round property of the AES. We modify 20 bytes from 5 intermediate values at some fixed locations in 5 consecutive rounds, and we demonstrate that after 5 rounds of operations, such modifications do not change the intermediate result and finally, still produce the same ciphertext. We introduce an algorithm named δ, and the δ algorithm takes a plaintext and a key as two inputs and outputs 20 bytes, which are used in the 5-round property. By employing the δ algorithm, we define a modified version of the AES algorithm, the δAES. The δAES calls the δ algorithm to generate 20 bytes, and uses these 20 bytes to modify the AES round keys. For a plaintext and a key, the AES and the δAES produce the same ciphertext. By employing the proposed algebraic property of the AES, we analyse the internal structure of the ALPHA-MAC. Firstly, we present a method to find second preimages of the ALPHA-MAC by solving eight groups of linear functions based on the assumption that an authentication key or an intermediate value of this MAC is known. Each of these eight groups of linear functions contains two equations. Secondly, we show that the second-preimage finding method can also be used to generate internal collisions. The proposed collision search method can find two five-block messages such that they produce 128-bit collisions under a selected key (or a selected intermediate value).
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a brief description of the AES algorithm and Section 3 describes a five-round algebraic property of the AES. A modified version of the AES is defined in Section 4. Section 5 shows a description of the ALPHA-MAC construction and Section 6 demonstrates how the proposed five-round property of the AES is used to find second preimages and internal collisions of the ALPAH-MAC. Section 7 concludes this paper. Some examples of the AES and the AES with 20 extra exclusive-or operations are provided in the Appendix.
Description of the AES
AES is a block cipher with a 128-bit block length and supports key lengths of 128, 192 or 256 bits. For encryption, the input is a plaintext block and a key, and the output is a ciphertext block. The plaintext is first copied to 4 × 4 array of bytes, which is called the state. Figure 1 , and the 20 bytes are 0 2 8 10 0 , , , , , In Figure 1 , a zero occupied byte means that there is no change in that byte, and a variable occupied byte indicates that there is a modification in that byte. In Figure 2 
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At this moment, we have decided the values of { , , }and{ , } 
There is an algebraic relation between Bytes 0 , , , , 
We form two groups of linear functions, marked by (7) and (8). There are two undecided variables 0 2 and X X * * in (7), and we can solve (7) 
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At this stage, we have decided the values of { , , , }, and
′ is not determined and it is equal to the initial value, i ∈ {0, 2, 8, 10}. 
Deciding
Bytes 0 , , and Z Z Z Z are obtained from the computation in which the AES algorithm is used to encrypt the plaintext P under the key K (see Round 5 in Figure 2) ):
Finally, we have decided all values of { , , , , },
Now, we carry out a 5-round computation of the AES with extra 20 XOR operations, called Routine Computation Three, by using Bytes
and Z Z ′ and we will get the same input to Round 6 as the AES algorithm. 
Variants of algorithm δ
We show that there are other variants of the δ algorithm. In 
The modified version of the AES: δAES
By employing the δ algorithm, we propose a modified version of the AES, which is named δAES. The major difference between the AES and the δAES is that the δAES uses modified AES round keys. In Figure 3 The construction of the δAES is adding two procedures, which are calling the δ algorithm and modifying the AES round keys, to the AES algorithm.
1 Suppose for a plaintext P and a cipher key K, the AES algorithm produces a ciphertext C, written as C = AES K (P).
2 By accepting P and K as two inputs, use the δ algorithm to generate 20 output bytes:
Apply the AES key scheduling algorithm to K and get the round keys. 5 After carrying out the transformations above, the δAES uses the same round function (i.e. SB, SR, MC and ARK) to process the plaintext P with modified AES round keys, and finally, the δAES also generates the same cipher-text C, denoted by C = δAES(P).
Appendix provides some examples of the AES and the AES with 20 extra exclusive-or operations.
AES round keys and δAES round keys
Suppose K is a 128-bit AES cipher key, and after key expansion, the AES round keys are denoted by
where i is the round number, {1, 2, , 10}. i ∈ … The round key used in the initial round is the secret key K itself, and the secret key is denoted without the superscript i.
The δAES round keys come from the following routine (see Figure 5 ):
1 In Initial Round, Rounds 6-10, use the corresponding AES round keys without any changes.
2 In Rounds 1-5, use the modified AES round keys. After applying 20 XOR operations to the AES round keys, the δAES round key i is calculated by the following formulas: , {0, 2,8,10 } , {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,8, 9,11,12,13,14 
Like AES, the ALPHA-MAC round function contains SB, SR, MC and ARK, and the output of each injection layout acts as the corresponding 128-bit round key. The message padding method appends a single 1 followed by the minimum number of 0 bits such that the length of the result is a multiple of 32. In the initialisation, the state is set to all zeros and AES is applied to the state. For every message word, the chaining method carries out an iteration, and each iteration maps the bits of the message word to an injection input. After that, a sequence of AES round functions are applied to the state, with the round keys replaced by the injection input. In the final transformation, AES is applied to the state. The MAC tag is the first l m bits of the resulting final state. The length of l m may have any value less than or equal to 128. The ALPHA-MAC function is depicted in Figure 6 . 
Applying the property to ALPHA-MAC
We study the internal structure of the ALPHA-MAC by employing the proposed five-round algebraic property of AES, which is described in Section 3. Firstly, we present a method to find second preimages of the ALPHA-MAC by solving eight groups of linear functions, based on the assumption that an authentication key or an intermediate value of this MAC is known. Each of these eight groups of linear functions contains two equations. We divide the second-preimage search algorithm into two steps: the backwards-and-forwards (BNF) search and the backwards-and-backwards (BNB) search. The BNF search provides an idea for extending 32-to 128-bit collisions 2 by solving four groups of linear functions. Given a key (or an intermediate value) and one four-block message, the BNB search can generate another four-block message such that these two messages produce 32-bit collisions, which are a prerequisite for the BNF search. To do the BNB search, we need to solve another four groups of linear functions. By combining the BNB search with the BNF search, we can find second preimages of ALPHA-MAC. Secondly, we show that the second-preimage finding method can also be used to generate internal collisions. The proposed collision search method can find two five-block messages such that they produce 128-bit collisions under a selected key (or a selected intermediate value).
The second-preimage search algorithm
The second-preimage search algorithm aims to find a five-block second-preimage M for a selected five-block message M, under a selected key (or a selected intermediate value). The assumption of this search is that we know two values: a selected key (or a selected intermediate value) and a selected five-block message M. The result of the search is that M and M generate the same 128-bit value after five rounds of ALPHA-MAC iterations, under the selected key (or the selected intermediate value).
We use Figure 7 to illustrate the second-preimage search. Figure 7 depicts five consecutive rounds of the ALPHA-MAC for two different five-block messages M and . M We assume that we are able to select an intermediate value of the round functions in some round (e.g. in Round y − 3), and select five consecutive message blocks
.
Then we can find another five-block message 
The five-block collisions
In the case of a selected key, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that Method: Solve eight groups of linear functions. These eight groups of functions are named as (9)- (16) in this section.
The second-preimage search algorithm consists of two steps: the BNF search and the BNB search. The BNF search can extend 32-to 128-bit collisions, given two messages M and M which collide on 32 bits, namely Bytes s 4 , s 12 , s 6 and s 14 , after MC in Round y (see Figure 7) . Given a key (or an intermediate value) and one four-block message, the BNB search is able to find another four-block message such that these two messages collide on Bytes s 4 , s 12 , s 6 and s 14 after MC in Round y. The BNB search generates those 32-bit collisions which are required for the BNF search. By merging the BNB search with the BNF search, we can find second preimages of the ALPHA-MAC.
The BNF search
The BNF search has the following form: Known: 1 A selected key or a selected intermediate value.
2 Two four-block messages Extend: 32-bit collisions to 128-bit collisions in Round y + 1.
Method: Solve four groups of linear functions. These four groups of functions are numbered as (9)-(12) in this section.
The BNF search assumes that we are able to find two messages M and , M which collide on Bytes s 4 , s 12 , s 6 and s 14 after MC in Round y. Based on the algebraic property of the MC transformation and the structure of ALPHA-MAC, we can extend these 32-to 128-bit collisions within three rounds by solving four groups of linear equations. 
Extending 32-to 64-bit collisions
To find out the values of (R, T) and (S, U), we need to solve the following two groups of equations. 
Extending 96-to 128-bit collisions

The BNB search
The BNB search has the following form:
Known: 1 A selected key or a selected intermediate value.
2 One selected four-block message The routine of finding second preimages is shown in Table 1 , and Figure 8 depicts this finding. The name of the BNB search comes from the fact that searching for Table 1 ). A personal computer takes about 1 sec to find a second preimage of the ALPHA-MAC. A found second preimage of a selected key K (see Table 2 ) and a selected five-block message M (see Table 3 ) is M (shown in Table 3 ). The 128-bit colliding value is listed in Table 4 (note that these two messages are listed after injection layout).
Figure 8
The second-preimage search Table 1 Second-preimage search = BNB search + BNF search Find: Two five-block messages M and M such that they collide under the selected key or the intermediate value.
Method: Employ the second-preimage search.
In the second-preimage search, we choose the first fiveblock message arbitrarily, and once it is decided, we do not modify it. All we need to do is modify the second five-block message so that 128-bit collisions happen. Therefore, the second-preimage search can also be used to find two colliding five-block messages under a selected key (or a selected intermediate value).
Conclusion
We described a five-round algebraic property of the AES algorithm. In the presented property, we change 20 bytes from 5 intermediate values at some fixed locations in 5 consecutive rounds by carrying out 20 extra XOR operations, and we show that after 5 rounds of processing, such modifications do not change the intermediate result and finally, still produce the same ciphertext. We defined an algorithm named δ, and by employing the δ algorithm, we constructed a modified version of the AES, the δAES. For a plaintext and a key, the AES and the δAES produce the same ciphertext. We then showed that the five-round algebraic property of the AES can be used to analyse the internal structure of the ALPHA-MAC, a MAC function whose underlying block cipher is AES. We provided a second-preimage search algorithm and a collision search algorithm. 
